[Book Review of] Easterly, William: The elusive quest for growth : economists' adventures and misadventures in the tropics : Cambridge, MA : MIT Press, 2001. by Gundlach, Erich
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Gundlach, Erich
Book Review
[Book Review of] Easterly, William: The elusive quest for growth :
economists' adventures and misadventures in the tropics :
Cambridge, MA : MIT Press, 2001
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
Provided in cooperation with:
Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW)
Suggested citation: Gundlach, Erich (2002) : [Book Review of] Easterly, William: The elusive
quest for growth : economists' adventures and misadventures in the tropics : Cambridge, MA :
MIT Press, 2001, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, ISSN 0043-2636, Vol. 138, Iss. 2, pp. 366-370,
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/2792BOOK REVIEWS
Easterly, William, The Elusive Questfor Growth. Eeonomists' Adventures andMisad-
ventures in the Tropies. Cambridge, Mass. 2001. MIT Press. 342 pp.
Easterly has written a unique book about the international differences in the stan-
dard ofliving, which have never been larger in the history ofmankind than today. What
makes Easterly's book unique is the masterly mixture of four elements: a first-hand
knowledge ofdeveloping countries, a rigorous applicationofanalytical concepts, adeep
compassion for the people behind the statistical numbers, and an irresistible sense of
humor and irony. For instance, Easterly notes that he was optimistic about the growth
prospects of Ghana when he lived there for a year in 1969-1970, but that his projec-
tions did not receive a great deal of public notice, which, as he mentions in passing,
probably resulted because he had just finished elementary schooI.
The point is that Easterly was not alone in his assessment at the time. Many well-
known economists were also optimistic about the growth prospects ofGhana in the first
decade after independence in 1957. The reason for their optimism was a certain theo-
retical model that predicted a simple formula for growth. With the benefit ofhindsight,
it is ofcourse fairly simple to understand why this particular model was wrong. What
is probably more difficult to accept for development economists is the general lesson
ofthe book. New magic strategies for growth and development come and go, but obvi-
ously all ofthem have failed to make poorcountries rich. This insight may notbe entire-
ly new, but it is presented in a way that helps to clarify one's one misconceptions about
the benefits ofthis or that development strategy. It is Easterly's unparalleled combina-
tion offacts, theory, passion, and humor that does the trick.
Easterly starts with some facts which highlight the differences in the standard ofliv-
ing between poor and rich countries. Today, about 900 million people live in prosper-
ity as compared to about 1.2 billion people living in extreme poverty on less than 1dol-
lar per day. Poverty is not just low income, extreme poverty means high child mortal-
ity, malnutrition, and generally discrimination ofthe poorby the rich. In principle, pov-
erty couldbe reduced eitherby redistributing income from the rich or by overall growth.
Easterly points outthat growth has been much more ofa life saverto the poorthan redis-
tribution. His evidence shows that there is a strong empirical link between economic
growth and poverty reduction, and that higher growth in average per capita income
apparently translates one-for-one into higher per capita income ofthe poor. These facts
set the stage for the quest for growth: what economic policies would free the poor from
hunger and disease or, more generally, what economic policies would make poor coun-
tries rich?
An amazingly simple answer was provided by the Harrod-Domar growth model.
According to that model, growth will be proportional to the share ofinvestment spend-
ing in GDP. So the model could be used to identify a so-called financing gap for each
and every poor country. The factor of proportion could simply be estimated from the
relation between the growth rate and the share ofinvestment and used to calculate the
required amount of "needed" investment necessary to achieve a targeted growth rate.
Working for the World Bank until recently, Easterly knows that the financing gap
approach has been widely applied by the international financial institutions in order to
channel large amounts of foreign aid to poor countries, but unfortunately was never
checked against actual experience.
In fact, the idea of aid for investment for growth did not work out in reality. As it
seems, the experience ofTunisia is the only case outofa sampie of 138 countries where
the model's predictions are somehow in line with the empirieal facts. Hence, Easterly
safely concludes that the model does not make any sense. Nevertheless, the ghost ofthisBook Reviews 367
model stilllives on in many circles, as revealed by occasional statements ofinternation-
al financial institutions aboutincreases in investment"needed"to achievehighergrowth
rates.
As pointed out by Easterly, the reason for the model's complete failure is obvious:
itignores thatpeoplerespond to incentives. Giving aid in orderto fill apresumedfinanc-
ing gap does not change the incentives to invest for the future. Without a change in
incentives, the recipientsofaidwill notincreasetheirinvestment; they willonlyincrease
their consumption. What is worse, the availability of aid may even change incentives
in the wrong direction because a country is likely to get more aid the lower its saving
rate. So in the end, the strategy ofaid for investment for growth may induce incentives
that get countries caught in poverty traps.
This is Easterly's recurring theme: people respond to incentives. Hence any success-
ful development strategy has to create incentives for growth for the trinity of govern-
ments, donors, and individuals. Taken at face value, hardly a new insight, but truly
revealing when applied in context to all the failed strategies for growth and develop-
ment that have been attempted in the past. And since the demolition of various devel-
opment strategies is backed by hard facts, enlightened by insightful anecdotal evidence
from field work, and salted by a style of writing which is quite uncommon in the eco-
nomics literature, Easterly's book is a pleasure to read.
After annihilating the idea that there is something like a financing gap in poor coun-
tries that could be easily filled with aid to achieve growth in the next period, Easterly
turns to the idea that investment may at least be an important determinant of long-run
growth. The Solow growth model explains why this idea, sometimes called capital fun-
damentalism, is also wrong. To see why, read about Easterly's failed attempt to sustain
the growth ofpancake production, as more and more friends ofhis kids arrive for break-
fast, by adding only one ofmany production factors. Such a strategy cannot work in the
long run because ofdiminishing returns. And since capital accounts for only one third
ofproduction in poor and rich countries alike, decreasing returns to investment will set
in very fast. Back to Easterly's main theme: investing in additional machinery is use-
less when incentives for growth are lacking.
The same holds for investing in additional human capital. Taken at face value, the
strong educational expansion in almost all countries over the last four decades has not
delivered the growth miracles that should have followed ifmore education were the key
factor for a sustainablerise in the standard ofliving. Easterly convincingly suggests that
the reason for this disappointing result is the same as before: expanding education is
worth little ifincentives to invest in the future are not there.
Foreign aid to finance population control- as Easterly puts it, cash for condoms - is
another panacea for promoting prosperity in poor countries that did not work. At this
stage ofthebook, thereason is already obvious: desiredfertility is a function ofthe incen-
tives for investment in the quantity and quality of children. More condoms as such do
not change these investment incentives. Still other development strategies like channel-
ing loans to poor countries conditional on policy reforms that should provide the right
incentives for investing in the future - so-called adjustment lending - also did not work.
The main reason was that the donors did not discriminate very much between more cor-
rupt and less corrupt governments (often for non-economic reasons), and this indiscrim-
inate lending created poor incentives for making the reforms necessary for growth.
Debt forgiveness (Jubilee 2000) is the latest panacea for relieving poverty of poor
countries. This is more orless ignoring thatdebt forgiveness has already had a long his-
tory. So far, there have been very few success stories, for the same fundamental reason
as with the other poverty-reducing strategies: debt forgiveness can do no good ifit does
not change the incentives to invest in the future. In fact, new borrowing was the high-
est in countries that got the most debt relief in the past. Hence, Easterly concludes that368 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 2002, Vol. 138(2)
high debt may remain a persistent problemjustbecause high debt reflects irresponsible
governments that remain irresponsible after debt relief is granted.
In the second major part ofhis book, Easterly turns to policy suggestions that might
actually deliver, thereby stressing that his incentives-based views on growth should not
be considered as a new panacea for development. This part is necessarily more specu-
lative because not all underlying implications have been (or can be) estimated empiri-
cally. Forinstance,Easterlyfavors aviewofdevelopmentwhichis dominatedby increas-
ing returns to knowledge incombination with the ideathat skills complementeach other.
Such a view mayaIso offer insights on the incentives for accumulating skills, on the
likely direction of migration, and on poverty and wealth traps (as weIl as on compara-
tive advantage, as it turns out), which seem to fit the facts quite weIl and certainly bet-
ter than models based only on diminishing returns. So the presenceofincreasing returns
to knowledge could actually explain why there could be different incentives for skill
accumulation, depending on the initial level of skiIl accumulation to begin with, and
given that skills actually complement each other.
With a view on policy implications, the big difference between Easterly's view of
the development process and a conventional view based on diminishing returns is that
vicious and virtuous circles cannot form in the latter case. But with increasing returns
to knowledge and skill complementarities, what maUers for the productivity ofindivid-
ual investmentdecisions is the overall investment level ofa society. As a result, income
differences would not be explained by the individuals' effort to accumulate physical
and human capital, but by differences in knowledge and matching opportunities across
countries and regions. In such a view, poor people face weak incentives just because
their knowledge-Ieaking and their skill-matching is dominated by other poor people.
The policy implication is that government intervention may be necessary to get an
economy out of a poverty trap. While this may sound optimistic in principle, Easterly
is eager to warn that bad government policies are in many if not most cases the very
reason for a poverty trap. And even an honest government setting all the right incen-
tives to escape from a poverty trap may not succeed because the final outcome could be
sensitive to initial conditions ofknowledge and skill and, most importantly, to expec-
tations about outcomes, all ofwhich are probably impossible to quantify in advance.
A more optimistic view would be based on the idea that backward economies may
jumpto new technologies which are not implemented on a large scale in advanced econ-
omies due to vested interests of workers and industries working with old technologies.
Hence new technologies may be more easily introduced in countries which lack much
existing technologies. The rise ofJapan's steel industry relative to the V.S. steel indus-
try after the Second World War provides an illustrative example. But as Easterly notes,
possible positive effects ofeconomic backwardness must not be overemphasized since
the negative effects ofbackwardness on growth are also always at work. Nevertheless,
poor countries do not have to invent new technologies. They can import them, either
through foreign direct investment or through the import of capital goods. In this view,
the possibility of technology import, with all of its potential self-enforcing effects, is
the reason why openness, at least in some sectors, is a necessary prerequisite for suc-
cessful economic development.
Another possibility is that new technology is complementary to old technology,
which would offset any advantages ofbackwardness and enforce path dependencies, as
in the discussion ofincreasing returns to knowledge. Which ofthe possibilities prevails
depends, aceording to Easterly, on both luck and government policy. On understanding
the importanee ofluck (or bad luck, for that matter), what is now held to be the reason
for the extinetion ofthe dinosaurs may provide a good example. Living in a rieh coun-
try, it is indeed easy to forget how much poor people and even pooreountries as a whole
can suffer from natural disasters and the prevalenceofdiseases. Sheerluck is a constantBook Reviews 369
influence on growth and may explain a large partofthe short-run fluctuations in growth.
But in the long run, it seems that government policies have a strong association with
growth and prosperity.
Government policies can at least fairly easily destroy the incentives for investing in
the future. High inflation, high black marketpremiums, negative real interest rates, high
budget deficits, restrictions on free trade, and inadequate public services are all meas-
ures that act like a tax on future income, which will result in slow growth or stagnation
or worse, as shown with detailed evidence for single countries and for groups ofcoun-
tries. Yet Easterly warns again that macroeconomic reform should not be regarded as
the new panacea for growth. This is because incentives are not only shaped by (bad)
economic policies but also by the institutions that set the rules for transactions within
a society.
As an example of institutional failure, Easterly discusses the effects of corruption
on growth. Corruption can be thought of as a tax on productive activities and hence
should reduce the potential for growth. But the relation between corruption and growth
appears to be rather complex. Both Indonesia and Zaire were rated as highly corrupt
countries but showed very different growth records. Easterly suggests that it matters
much for growth outcomes whether corruption is decentralized as in Mobuto's Zaire or
centralized as in Suharto's Indonesia: corruption will be more damaging to growth in a
weak state than in a strong state. The reason for the different outcomes - you guessed
it - is the different set ofincentives that emerges under the different systems ofcorrup-
tion. The way out would be to create credible institutions which substantially reduce
the incentives for corruption. The obvious problem is to get things moved: a weak cor-
rupt state would be unable to do it and a strong corrupt state would be unwilling to do
it. So in most cases, reliefmay only come by civil war or by outside interference (or by
acombination ofboth), which is aconsequence thatEasterly may be aware ofbutavoids
to discuss.
Easterly's answer to why some governments face seemingly self-defeating incen-
tives to destroy growth is that in many poor countries governments are coalitions rep-
resenting different factions of people. Polarization in weak governments can explain
why each interest group assigned to a certain policy field like export licensing, money
creation, credit allocation, or government spending may try to get as many resources as
possible from the assigned activity without taking into account the effects ofsuch a pol-
icy on all other activities. Though each faction would act perfectly rational in serving
the interests ofits constituency, the overall outcome would be the combination ofhigh
black market rates, rising inflation, negative real interest rates, and soaring budget def-
icits, which is not uncommon for many crisis countries. Hence bad policies may persist
for a long time in countries with multiple interest groups, because no group faces an
incentive to change its behavior.
Summarizing various contributions from the field of political economy, Easterly
argues that it does not make a large difference whether multiple interest groups result
from high income inequality or from ethnic fractionalization. In both cases, and espe-
cially in combinations of both, the predicted outcome is lower growth than in nations
with a more equal income distribution and a less ethnically divided population. It seems
thatthis predictionis borne outby the empiricalfacts pretty well. Still, as Easterly notes,
this interpretation of the empirical evidence heavily relies on his leaks-matches-traps
view ofgrowth. One implication ofthis view would be that discrimination, for instance
against ethnic minorities, would appear as a rationale strategy for a single faction of
people but would necessarily result in lower overall growth than would be possible oth-
erwise.
10 the end, Easterly frankly admits that trying to make poorcountries rieh has raised
more questions than it has answered: there are 00 magie formulas for development.370 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 2002, Vol. 138 (2)
While it is almost self-evident that prosperity will happen if a11 the players in the devel-
opment process face the right incentives, the harder part is to devise ways and means
that would achieve such a situation. What is necessary for growth is that government
incentives induce investment in collective goods like education, health, and the rule of
law rather than fighting overthe redistribution ofexisting income, that donor incentives
induce aid flowing to countries with proven good policies rather than to countries with
nonreformist governments, and that the poor face investment incentives through wel-
fare programs that reward rather than penalize earning income. While this is hardly an
encouraging message for countries that are polarized by antagonistic interest groups,
Easterly stresses thatunderstanding the reasons for poorgovernmentincentives in polar-
ized societies may at least hold the key for a future ending of the vicious circle ofbad
policies and poor growth. Preaching at poor countries to change their policies, as in the
past, will not do as long as there are no incentives to change policies.
Giventhe proverbialdisagreements between any twoeconomists on any singletopic,
surely nobody will agree with all of Easterly's assessments. My personal list of dis-
agreements is rather short and touches only minor issues. In theory, I think that it is not
entirely plausible to argue that the Solow model provides a basic insight about long-run
growth but cannot be applied in a cross-country context (the residual may not only
include technology in a narrow sense). And I find the basic structure ofthe AK model
ofRebelo, mentioned as oneofthe seminal new growth models, pretty close to the struc-
ture ofthe Harrod-Domar model that Easterly smashes in the first part ofthe book.
On empirics, there are ofcourse endless opportunities for different assessments, but
I find Easterly's interpretations of the empirical evidence very convincing, not least
because it is always backed by references to peer-reviewed literature. With direct rele-
vance to Easterly's underlying theoretical structure, I think that even ifthere is astrang
link between changes in human capital and economic growth, which Easterly denies,
his people-respond-to-incentives story would hold nevertheless (but the quantitative
importance ofhis leaks-matches-traps idea would probably be somewhatreduced). And
I am a bit skeptical whether we really have convincing empirical support for the idea
that higher (public) investment in research and development actually correlates with
higher growth, not to speak of a causal link.
Yet quibbles like these merely reflect that Easterly very successfully demolishes
many widely held ideas about growth and development, including my own, and at the
same time shows where to look for better alternatives. This is economics at work at its
best. Forall economists interestedin growth and development (are there any otherecon-
omists?), there is no chance not to get hooked to Easterly's book.
Erich Gundlach
Jovanovic, Miroslav N., Geography 0/Production and Economic Integration. Rout-
ledge Studies in the Modern World Economy 28. London, New York 2001. Rout-
ledge. 327 pp.
Over the last decade, economic integration, and its impact on the location of eco-
nomic activity, has received substantial attention - both among academics and among
policy makers. The developments within new trade theory and new economic geogra-
phy have boosted this interest by providing an analytical framework suitable for anal-
ysis ofthe issue. At the same time, the fast progressing and deepening integration pro-
cess ofthe European Union has led to a special emphasis on this subject in Europe, and
placed it high on the agenda of researchers and politicians. The major question that
everyone seeks an answer to is what will be the outcome of European integration: is